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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in effect, that the intestates themselves had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision, in spite of the obvious differences in maneuverability
between pedestrians and occupants of stalled vehicles. If such is the
substantive law of last clear chance as applied to vehicle-train collisions,
allegations based on similar facts will not permit consideration of last
clear chance because the proof could not satisfy the legal definition
which the court has placed on the words "peril" or "danger." 29 There-
fore, the fault would lie not with the pleading form, but with a failure
of plaintiff's proof to avoid a finding that his negligence was concur-
rent, or "contributory" as a matter of law. The Bailey case might
easily have been decided without reference to the pleading form,
thereby preventing some of the precedural mystery of its holding.
Regardless of whether the court considers the doctrine of last
clear chance to be a theory alternate to and distinct from ordinary
negligence, or as merely a facet of the over-all inquiry into the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, the results are the same. A plaintiff hoping
to take advantage of the doctrine is evidently no longer permitted to
rely on the ordinary allegations of negligence with the privilege of get-
ting special instructions to the jury on the issue should the evidence
produce a case where the last clear chance doctrine would be applicable.
The recent North Carolina decisions seem to mean that specific facts
which would give rise to the operation of the doctrine should be pleaded
in the complaint on an alternative basis in a separate count, or included
by way of reply30 to an answer which sets up a defense of contributory
negligence.
ROBERT B. MILLMAN, JR.
Taxation-Ad Valorem Tax on Flight Equipment of Interstate
Airlines
Interstate business must pay its way1 and its "way" may properly
be regarded as the protection, services, and other benefits afforded by
those authorities through whose jurisdictions such business operates.
2
By daily use of airports, the aircraft of interstate carriers directly
receive a major part of the services and other benefits furnished by
the taxpayers of the jurisdiction in which the airports are located. It
would seem to follow that such aircraft properly may be the subject
of ad valorem property taxes.
"' Dowdy and Burns v. Southern Ry., 237 N. C. 519, 75 S. E. 2d 639 (1953).
"0 See Redwine v. Bass, 215 N. C. 467, 2 S. E. 2d 362 (1939).
'Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259 (1919).
'Ibid. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S. 590, 606
(1954) ; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 174 (1949);
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board the Supreme
Court of the United States for the first time considered and upheld
a state tax upon the flight equipment of an interstate carrier doing
business within the state but incorporated in another state. The Court
held against the airline's principal argument that its aircraft "never
attained a taxable situs within Nebraska" 4 and said that eighteen stops
per day in that state are "sufficient to establish Nebraska's power to
tax even though the same aircraft do not land every day and even though
none of the aircraft is continuously within the State."5  It seems clear
that this decision means that the aircraft of interstate airlines are within
the tax jurisdiction of each state in which they make daily stops.
It would seem that similar property in North Carolina is taxable,
since "all property, real and personal, within the jurisdiction of the
State, not especially exempt, shall be subject to taxation." 6  The flight
equipment of foreign commercial airlines is not exempt from taxation
under the North Carolina Constitution or tax laws.7
Property taxable by the state is taxable by the subdivisions thereof
through delegation of power.8 In North Carolina, property taxation
by local authorities is provided for in the Machinery Act.9 At least
as late as 1944, North Carolina tax administrators had found a suf-
ficient degree of uncertainty regarding the application of the Machinery
Act to the aircraft of interstate airlines to deter them from attempting
to list, value, and collect a tax on such property.10 The purpose of
this note is to examine some of the problems giving rise to this un-
certainty. The sections of the Machinery Act discussed in this note
have not been amended so as to change the problems which existed in
1944 as regards air commerce..'
-347 U. S. 590 (1954).
'Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U. S. 590, 598 (1954).
' Id. at 601. In so holding, the Supreme Court for the first time applied
to aircraft the traditional "doctrine of apportionment, as the basis of property
taxation," i.e., that "a State may levy ah ad valorem tax on the basis of a show-
ing that the total time spent in a State by different units of a carrier's property
is such that a certain proportion of that property may be said to have a per-
manent location in that State." Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska: State Board,
347 U. S. 590, 607 (1954) (dissenting opinion). The court has previously applied
this doctrine to railroad cars, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141
U. S. 18 (1891), and to barges, Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336
U. S. 169 (1949).
IN. C. GENq. STAT. § 105-281 (1950).
N. C. CoNsT. Art. V, §§ 3, 5; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-297, 105-396 (1950).
'64 C. J.. S., Municipal Corporations § 2000 (1950).
I N. C. Gmx. STAT. § 105-271 et seq. (1950). Preamble: "An act to provide
for the listing and valuing of all property, real, personal and mixed, at its true
value in money, and to provide' for the taxation thereof by counties, munici-
palities and other local tax authorities upon a uniform ad valorem basis."1 0H. R Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Taxation of Air Com-
inerce 19 n. 11 (1945).
" See N. C. Sass. LAws 1945, c. 973; N. C. Sass. LAWS 1947, c. 836; N. C.
Sass. LAws 1951, c. 728; N. C. SEss. LAws 1951, c. 1102.
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Section 800 (1) of the Machinery Act' provides for the listing
of all tangible property at the "residence" of the owner, defining the
"residence" of a foreign or domestic corporation as its "principal of-
fice" within North Carolina. The Machinery Act furnishes neither
a definition of "principal office" nor a criterion for determining its loca-
tion. The corporation domestication statute,13 however, provides that
every foreign corporation, "before being permitted to-do business in
this state," shall file in the office of the Secretary of State of North
Carolina an attested statement setting forth, among other things, its
"principal office" in North Carolina.14 The Secretary of State is
directed by the statute to require every foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in North Carolina fully to comply with this provision.'8 Thus
it appears that the principal office of a foreign airline lawfully doing
business in North Carolina must be recorded in the office of the Secre-
tary of State. It seems a logical conclusion that such principal office
is the one at which the property of a foreign corporation shall be listed
for taxation under Section 800 (1) of the Machinery Act. Although
this analysis furnishes no satisfactory definition of "principal office,"
it establishes an element of certainty for tax listing purposes.
Section 800 (1) further provides, "if a corporation ... has no prin-
cipal office in this State" it may list its tangible personal property "at
any place at which said property is situated." Under the preceding
analysis, a foreign corporation lawfully doing business in North Caro-
lina must have a principal office in this state, therefore it would seem
clear that this provision of Section 800 (1) does not apply to such
corporations.16 However, this provision does not specifically exclude
foreign corporations from its application. Furthermore, Section
800 (4)17 provides that "tangible personal property shall be listed at
the place where such property is situated, rather than at the residence' 8
of the owner if the owner or person having control thereof hires or
occupies [among other things, an] office . . . therein for use in con-
nection with such property." Thus, a significant question of construc-
tion appears unavoidable: Where would the flight equipment of a
foreign airline doing business in North Carolina be "situated" for tax
listing purposes?
'IN. C. GEr. STAT. § 105-302 (1) (Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-117 et seq. (1950)." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-118 (1950; Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-120 (1950).
" Presumably, this provision was enacted to encompass the property of domes-
tic corporations and that of foreign corporations having property in North Caro-
lina but doing no business in the state, e.g., a tract of timber purchased but left
standing by a foreign lumber company.
17N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302 (4) (1950).
SI.e., "principal office" in the case of foreign corporations. See Machinery
Act § 800 (1), discussed in the text, supra.
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The North Carolina court has recognized that there is "no ddcision
in this jurisdiction establishing any practical criterion for determining
when a specific chattel is situated in a particular place."' 0 In other
cases, our court has relied upon the definition, "having a site, situa-
tion or location permanently fixed; located." 20  This seems to be the
definition adopted in a wide variety of contexts by many courts through-
out the United States.21 Although ordinary words of a statute must
be given their natural, approved and recognized meaning,2z it seems
apparent that the usual meaning of "situated" is inappropriate to apply
a tax on instrumentalities of interstate carriers which make only brief
stops within any given jurisdiction.
Even if a satisfactory meaning of "situated" could be determined
within the context of Section 800 (4), as applied to foreign air carriers,
there might be some doubt that this provision applies to such corpora-
tions at all. At first blush, it might seem apparent that every major
airline would hire or occupy an office at each major airport through
which it operates for use in connection with its flight equipment. How-
ever, it is believed that the common practice is for agents to "hire or
occupy" desk and advertising space at such airports. Even if such
space were deemed an "office" for the purposes of Section 800 (4), a
mere ticket agent is obviously not the owner of airline flight equipment,
and it seems clear that such an agent has no control over such air-
craft, but merely furthers his principal's business in relation to the
public.
The last sentence of Section 800 (4) provides, "When tangible
personal property which may be used by the public generally . . . is
placed at or on a location outside of the county of the owner or lessor,
such tangible personal property shall be listed for taxation in the county
where located." Since our court has defined "situated" as meaning
"located" 23 familiar problems once more arise. It would seem that
the instrumentalities of common carriers, whether motor vehicles or
aircraft, may properly be classed as "tangible personal property which
may be used by the public generally." Such property is certainly
"placed at or on a location outside of the county of the owner" when
employed in interstate commerce. Does this provision of Section
800 (4) apply only to domestic corporations? There is nothing in
the Act which so limits its application. Is the county of the owner
"0Montague Bros. v. W. C. Shepherd Co., 231 N. C. 551, 554, 58 S. E. 2d
118, 121 (1950).
"' Ibid. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 446, 53
S. E. 2d 520, 522 (1949).
"39 WoRDs & PHRASES 463 (Perm. Ed. 1953).
" Watson Industries v. Shaw, 235 N. C. 203, 69 S. E. 2d 505 (1952); Vic-
tory Cab Co. v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 572, 68 S. E. 2d 433 (1951).
22 See note 20 supra.
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that of the owner's principal office, where the owner is a foreign cor-
poration? That would seem a reasonable construction, 24 but if so held
by the court, then the problems regarding the location of that office, as
discussed in connection with Section 800 (1), supra, again arise.
A more difficult problem, underlying those already considered, re-
mains to be examined. The Machinery Act, Section 302,25 provides
that "All property, real and personal, shall be listed ... in accordance
with ownership and value as of the first day of January each year."
Even if this were interpreted to mean that each aircraft which landed
in a particular jurisdiction on January first could be listed for taxation,
there would be unlimited opportunity for tax avoidance by merely
eliminating New Year's Day flights in North Carolina, or by reducing
the number of stops within the state on that day. Even if these de-
vices were not resorted to, the various local authorities concerned would
be deprived of the tax revenue from aircraft landing within their juris-
diction during the other 364 days of the year. Apparently the North
Carolina Legislature recognized this problem when it provided for state
assessment and certification of apportioned value to local units for
taxation of public service companies and all other companies exercis-
ing the right of eminent domain.26  Unfortunately, no such provisions
exist which are applicable to interstate air carriers.
27
It seems apparent, therefore, that the Machinery Act does not pro-
vide for taxation of the flight equipment of interstate airlines doing
business in North Carolina. A valuable source of revenue28 is thereby
lost. What might be done to make this revenue available? There
appear to be three major possibilities:
FIRST: The wording of the Machinery Act sections considered
in this note might be amended to provide specifically for the listing
and assessing of transient property of interstate carriers.
SECOND: The list of public service companies contained in Article
24 The phrase was so construed for purposes of the venue statute, N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-79 (1953), in Roberson v. Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 120, 68 S. E.
1064 (1910).'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-280 (1950).
11 MAcIaiNY AcT Art. XVI, § 1600 et seq., N. C. GEN'. STAT. § 105-350
et seq. (1950)."'Even if commercial airlines are public service corporations, they are not
included in the list of such companies provided for in Art. XVI of the Machinery
Act, supra note 26, nor do they have the power of eminent domain in this state,
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 40-2 (Supp. 1953).
2 H. R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Taxation of Air Coin-
inerce 76 (1945). Table II. State and local property taxes paid by domestic
air carriers operating in the United States, by States, 1939-43.
[Selected] States 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
California $31,033 $29,599 $21,809 $34,949 $35,973
Illinois 24,569 26,977 32,512 40,617 45,409
Minnesota 31,749 37,263 46,442 40,376 30,280
North Carolina 3 5 37 29
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XVI, Section 1600 et seq. of the Machinery Act29 might be amended
to include airlines, so as to allow state assessment and certification of
apportioned value to local units for taxation.
THIRD: A special statute might be enacted specifically to encom-
pass the flight equipment of airlines operating in and through North
Carolina °  Such a statute should (1) require central assessment by
a state board or agency, (2) include a formula by which to determine
apportioned value allocable to this state, and (3) provide for central
collection of taxes and distribution thereof to local authorities. The
Nebraska statute3 ' would be a valuable model for such an act because
it is relatively simple and concise and because it has the sanction of
the United States Supreme Court in the Braniff case.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE.
Taxation-Effects of Federal Taxes on Partnership "Buy and Sell"
Agreements Funded by Life Insurance
In these days of high corporate taxes, many small and medium
sized businesses prefer to operate as partnerships, thus avoiding the
consequences of double taxation which are felt by closely held and
small family corporations. In assuming the partnership form, the
business associates are confronted with a problem with which cor-
porate organizations are not concerned. That is that under the gen-
eral law, upon the death of a partner, the partnership is automatically
dissolved, unless otherwise provided for in the partnership agreement.,
In case of dissolution, the surviving partners are trustees for the dece-
dent's partnership interests and are accountable to his estate. This
involves a valuation of the business and a possible sale of part or all
of the assets in order to pay the estate its due. Even if provisions
were made for continuance of the partnership, undoubtedly many a
profitable business would be wrecked by the incompatible interests
of the surviving partners and the decedent's representatives.
In order to solve this problem many partners have entered into
"buy and sell," or "survivor purchase," agreements during their life-
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-350 et seq. (1950)."There is no apparent reason why such a statute should not include the
trucks and busses of earth-bound carriers as well. Since the Machinery Act
does not provide specially for such property, it would seem that the sections
of that Act discussed in this note would be applicable to that property. Further-
more, in view of the number of highway carriers operating in this state, the
need for a special tax provision regarding such carriers seems even greater
than the need for such a provision applicable to airlines. However, the prob-
lems involved in the taxation of highway carriers are beyond the scope of this
note.
"NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1244 through 77-1250 (1950). See also ARIz. CODE
§ 73-2001 et seq. (Supp. 1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270.071 et seq. (1947).
'UNIFoR PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 31; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61 (1943).
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